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In December 1998, French and British leaders declared that the European Union 
(EU) must develop the capacity for autonomous military action to respond to 
international crises.  In December 1999, EU leaders meeting in Helsinki established the 
Headline Goal—defined as the autonomous ability to deploy 60,000 troops in 60 days for 
an operation lasting as long as one year to conduct the “Petersberg Tasks” of 
humanitarian intervention, peacekeeping, and peacemaking.  The deadline for the 
operational capability of the Headline Goal is December 2003.  Although in December 
2001 the EU declared that it had “some” operational capability, it remains unable to 
conduct certain Petersberg Tasks, especially “upper” level missions such as peacemaking 
on the model of NATO’s Kosovo intervention.  Despite the current military force 
structures of EU member states, significant capability shortfalls, and stagnant or 
declining defense budgets in most EU countries, it appears that the EU will be able to 
conduct lower-level Petersberg Tasks in permissive environments by December 2003.  
However, capabilities needed for upper level tasks, such as strategic airlift, will take 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
During the Franco-British Summit at St. Malo on 3-4 December 1998, French 
President Jacques Chirac, French Prime Minister Lionel Jospin, and British Prime 
Minister Tony Blair surprised many observers when they announced that the European 
Union “must have the capacity for autonomous military action, backed up by credible 
military forces, the means to decide to use them, and a readiness to do so, in order to 
respond to international crises.”1  For decades, NATO had been the most significant force 
in Western European military matters.  The Western European Union (WEU), established 
in 1954 on the basis of the 1948 Brussels Treaty, had chosen to “work in close co-
operation” with NATO and to “rely on the appropriate military authorities of NATO for 
information and advice on military matters.”2  The European Union had focused 
primarily on economic affairs, with limited involvement in non-military security matters.   
With St. Malo, the governments of the European Union expressed an intention to 
acquire crisis management means capable of operating on their own without American 
help or (by some perceptions) American interference.  The European Union, while then 
(and now) primarily concerned with common economic and monetary policies, was 
charged with the stewardship of this new endeavor.  The creation of an EU ability to 
deploy forces up to a level of 60,000 troops, as outlined in the Helsinki Headline Goal of 
December 1999, has been described by the EU as the first significant step in pursuing a 
European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP).   
The Headline Goal, the operational manifestation of the ESDP, outlined the 
requirements for autonomous EU military forces in general terms.  The new capabilities, 
to be composed of sovereign national contributions, would not constitute a standing force 
or a “Euro-army.”  Instead, individual nations would pledge forces to the EU’s force 
catalogue for possible use in times of need.  The term “military force” should therefore 
                                                 
1 St. Malo Joint Declaration, in Maartje Rutten, ed., From St. Malo to Nice.  European Defence: Core 
Documents, Chaillot Paper No. 47, (Paris: Western European Union Institute for Security Studies, May 
2001), 8. 
2 Article IV of the Modified Brussels Treaty, 23 October 1954, in Brussels Treaty: Texts of the Treaty, 
the Protocols and other Documents Concerning the Western European Union (Paris: Office of the Clerk of 
the Assembly, Western European Union, 1982), 7. 
2 
not be construed to mean a “permanent” or “standing” force.  This force would be tasked 
with the “Petersberg” missions of “humanitarian and rescue tasks, peacekeeping tasks, 
and tasks of combat forces in crisis management including peacemaking.”3  A corps- 
sized force of up to 60,000 troops is to be deployable in 60 days for operations of at least 
a year’s duration.  Additionally, the EU set the goal of having this force ready for 
deployment by 2003.4   
At the 19 November 2001 Capabilities Improvement Conference in Brussels, EU 
defense ministers met to discuss capability shortfalls that could potentially prevent EU 
forces from conducting some “Petersberg Task” operations.  In view of the dozens of 
capability shortfalls identified, the defence ministers agreed to implement the European 
Capability Action Plan (ECAP), which is a “bottom-up” approach to evaluate capability 
shortfalls and begin the process of remedying them.5  On 15 December 2001, EU leaders 
meeting at Laeken, Belgium, declared the ESDP “operational,” though not all the forces 
outlined in the Headline Goal were ready for deployment and significant capability 
shortfalls still existed.6  Nonetheless, this “operational” declaration has been one of the 
most noteworthy ESDP developments since the 1999 Helsinki Summit.  The purpose of 
this thesis is to assess the prospects for fulfillment of the Headline Goal and the 
significance of its fulfillment (or non-fulfillment) for NATO and the United States.  
A. RESEARCH QUESTIONS  
With the deadline of December 2003 rapidly approaching, defense establishments 
on both sides of the Atlantic are pondering some difficult questions raised by the prospect 
of troops conducting operations in Europe and further afield under the EU flag.  NATO 
and EU member countries are examining the implications of a fully operational and 
                                                 
3 Western European Union Council of Ministers Petersberg Declaration, 19 June 1992, available 
online at http://www.bits.de/NRANEU/docs/petersberg92.pdf.  This wording was adopted by the EU in the 
Amsterdam Treaty in 1997 (in force since 1999) and repeated in the Nice Treaty in 2000 (not yet in force, 
with ratification by all EU states still pending). 
4 Presidency Progress Report to the Helsinki European Council on Strengthening the Common 
European Policy on Security and Defence, Annex I to Annex IV, Helsinki, 10-11 December 1999, available 
online at http://ue.eu.int/Newsroom/LoadDoc.asp?BID=76&DID=59750&LANG=1. 
5 Statement on Improving European Military Capabilities, EU Capability Improvement Conference, 19 
November 2001, in Maartje Rutten, ed., From Nice to Laeken: European Defence Core Documents, 
Chaillot Paper No. 51, (Paris: European Union Institute for Security Studies, 2002), 98. 
6 Michael Smith, “EU Force ‘Operational’ Despite Relying on US,” The Daily Telegraph (London), 15 
December 2001, 16. 
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deployable EU military capability.  Rather than addressing the questions raised by one 
institution in particular, such as NATO, this thesis examines the Headline Goal force 
itself, and not the institutions that will be affected by the Headline Goal.  The key 
question examined by this thesis is: will the EU’s proposed Headline Goal military 
capability prove to be an autonomous, effective, and credible military force?  This 
question can be answered by examining the following closely related questions: 
(1)   What were the decisive factors in the formulation of the Helsinki Headline 
Goal and what events generated these driving factors? 
(2)   What are the proposed missions and actual operational requirements for the 
Headline Goal military force? 
(3)   What actions have the EU member states taken to meet these requirements? 
(4)   What is the likelihood that this assembly of national military forces will be 
capable of successfully conducting “Petersberg Task” operations, and what 
needs to be done to make it truly autonomous, effective, and credible? 
B. SIGNIFICANCE 
Ever since St. Malo, the idea of ESDP, including possible EU-led military operations, has 
been controversial.  The concept of an EU military force being assigned missions that NATO as a 
whole is not willing to undertake has forced many nations to rethink their policies on security and 
defense.  The concept has at times strained trans-Atlantic relations and relations among EU 
member nations, and in some circles it has also come to represent a challenge to NATO’s role in 
European security and defense.  In the European Union’s struggle to define its military role, the 
policies of its member nations have been faced with new challenges.  This is especially true for 
the three nations that have been the most actively involved in the process of creating this force, 
and that have also pledged the most troops to the force catalogue— France, Germany, and the 
United Kingdom (UK).  All three countries have played crucial roles in the process of European 
integration.  France and Germany are considered the “engine” of EU integration, especially on 
the economic and monetary front.  The UK, often lukewarm on issues of EU integration, 
dramatically reversed its policy regarding EU involvement in military security matters by 
endorsing the agreement at St. Malo.  These factors, coupled with the commonly held view that 
France, Germany, and the UK have also been the strongest military powers in Western Europe, 
make it clear that ESDP is not without substantial backing by countries that possess both an 
4 
ability to deliver the required forces should the EU call upon them, and the experience to use 
them effectively.  The EU could theoretically deliver quite an operational capacity with nations 
such as these three contributing to the Headline Goal force catalogue.  ESDP developments 
should be given a great deal of attention, because the potential for the EU to play a significant 
military role in Europe and beyond is evident. 
C. METHODOLOGY AND DATA 
This thesis analyzes only a narrow portion of the literature dedicated to the study 
of European security and defense matters.  Since the Headline Goal was recently 
established, the relevant documentation is somewhat limited.  However, primary sources 
such as the Chaillot Papers published by the EU’s Institute for Security Studies, official 
EU documents, and speeches made by the leaders of many EU member countries provide 
valuable material for analysis.  The secondary sources utilized include informational 
reports and analytical studies.   
The thesis is organized as follows.  Chapter II examines the origins of the 
European Union’s drive for military autonomy that has manifested itself in ESDP and the 
Headline Goal.  Several steps had to be taken before EU leaders met at Helsinki in 
December 1999 and endorsed the goal of creating an autonomous military force.  The 
driving factors behind the Headline Goal help to explain why these specific force 
requirements emerged from the discussions at Helsinki instead of other types of force 
requirements.   
Chapter III examines the operational requirements of the Headline Goal in light of 
its proposed missions.  It also examines the lack of commitment by EU countries to 
meeting the requirements of providing their armed forces with the troops and equipment 
that they could need to conduct “Petersberg Task” operations.  Since the Headline Goal 
does not call for a standing army, but rather a catalogue of capabilities that could be 
temporarily assigned to the EU, any lapses in preparing national forces for military 
contingencies could directly manifest themselves in any EU force.  This chapter looks at 
both where the shortfalls in preparation exist, and why they exist.  Chapter IV deals with 
the uncertain future that the Headline Goal faces.  To deal with the multitude of problems 
associated with standing up such a force, the EU member countries may need to change 
their approach to defense matters.  This chapter recommends ways to improve 
5 
capabilities and examines what else needs to be done to ensure the success of the force.  




















































II. A DRIVE FOR AUTONOMY: FACTORS AND EVENTS 
BEHIND THE HELSINKI HEADLINE GOAL 
 
A.       INTRODUCTION 
 The idea that there should be military institutions in Europe other than NATO is not a 
new one.  Though it was ultimately defeated on a procedural motion without a debate in the 
French National Assembly in 1954, the European Defence Community (EDC), a proposed six-
nation integrated European army, was the one of the first post-World War II attempts to create a 
purely European multinational military capability.7  Since then, numerous other initiatives have 
taken root, but none has surpassed NATO in terms of importance, nor has any such initiative 
attempted to do so. The WEU and the Eurocorps are both prime examples of defense initiatives 
designed to improve European military capabilities, while not attempting to either undermine or 
weaken the Alliance.   
The European Union’s ESDP is not aimed at undermining or weakening the Alliance.  
The projected Headline Goal force is designed to enable the EU to conduct crisis management 
interventions and other “Petersberg Tasks” when the Alliance as a whole is not willing to 
undertake such operations.  This is something that no European defense organization has proven 
capable of doing successfully when the need has arisen, although some ad hoc activities 
constitute honorable exceptions—for instance, the Italian-led “coalition of the willing” that 
conducted the “Operation Alba” intervention in Albania in 1997.  Thus, the EU is sailing in 
somewhat uncharted waters as it attempts to fill this role.  The motivations behind the Headline 
Goal and the events which have led to its development not only shed light on this drive for 
autonomy, but also show why the EU has stepped up to fill such a demanding role.  
B. FRANCE—CHAMPION OF EU AUTONOMY 
Whenever people discuss improved EU military capabilities, including an EU ability to 
operate without US support, a discussion about France will inevitably arise.  France has had a 
colorful military history in the decades since the end of the Second World War.  At first, the 
French were adamant in seeking a firm US commitment to European defense and a continued US 
military presence.  The French wanted the United States to ensure that, if a third world war broke 
                                                 
7 Stephen George and Ian Bache, Politics in the European Union (New York: Oxford University Press, 
2001), 69. 
8 
out, it would be fought entirely east of the Rhine and that American forces and military supplies 
would be available from the very start to defend French territory.8   
NATO was of course the institution that solidified that commitment, but US support was 
not as comprehensive as the French had anticipated.  The French felt betrayed by a lack of US 
support at Dien Bien Phu in 1954, and felt further betrayed by America’s harsh condemnation of 
the Franco-British-Israeli invasion of the Suez in 1956.9  Charles de Gaulle (President of France, 
1958-1969) felt that the French voice in NATO was becoming ever more overpowered by that of 
the United States.  When French doubts about the US commitment to Europe arose, tensions 
within the Alliance grew.  In spite of efforts by the United States to ease French concerns within 
the planning structures of NATO, de Gaulle withdrew France from NATO’s integrated military 
structure in 1966.10   
While the French remained in NATO’s political structure, cohesion among the rest of the 
allies may have been actually enhanced as the remaining allies were able to proceed with military 
decisions that had previously been delayed by France.11  The events leading up to this withdrawal 
had planted a seed of distrust for America among some of the French, particularly certain 
Gaullists.  France’s efforts to create an EU military capacity for autonomous action, with little or 
no dependence on NATO or the United States, may be partly attributed to these events, among 
many other factors.   
With the fall of the Berlin Wall in November 1989 and the following dissolution 
of the Warsaw Pact, the traditional thinking regarding Europe’s defense needed to be 
reexamined.12  On 9 April 1990, President George Bush and President François 
Mitterrand met in Key Largo, Florida, to bilaterally discuss the future of the Atlantic 
Alliance.13  From the US perspective, the primary strategic objective was to find a new 
role for NATO which would involve structured dialogue with the former adversaries to 
                                                 
8 Sean Kay, NATO and the Future of European Security (New York: Rowman & Littlefield, 1998), 23. 
9 Thomas Risse-Kappen, Cooperation Among Democracies: The European Influence on US Foreign 
Policy (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1995), 103. 
10 Kay, 43. 
11 Ibid. 
12 NATO Handbook (Brussels: NATO Office of Information and Press, 2001), 435. 
13 Jolyon Howorth, European Integration and Defence: The Ultimate Challenge, Chaillot Paper No. 
43 (Paris: Western European Union Institute for Security Studies, 2000), 16. 
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the East and also a definition of collective security tasks for the European theater.14  
France’s view was that NATO should remain the institution responsible for Article 5 
collective defense tasks, but that the European Community (EC) should lead in the 
stabilization of Eastern and Central Europe.  Moreover, the French advocated the creation 
of what would come to be called a European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI) for 
the assumption of collective security and crisis management tasks, which were to be 
“essentially European responsibilities.”15   
Though Mitterrand went away from the meeting with the impression that 
President Bush had agreed to consider this division of responsibilities, it soon became 
clear that the United States was in fact committed to revitalizing NATO for the collective 
security role in Europe.16  “The United States wanted to transform NATO from a military 
to a much more political alliance, embracing collective security tasks and immediately 
restructuring NATO’s military forces to reflect that new reality.”17  Thus, where the 
French saw a greater security role for the EU (then the EC), the Americans saw the same 
role for NATO.  These differing ideas at Key Largo about the new responsibilities for the 
two institutions would set the tone for the security debate that would develop in post-
Cold War Europe.  The United States saw NATO as an institution that could play several 
new security roles, whereas France thought NATO should concentrate on its Article 5 
mission while the EU would assume the new security functions.  
C. MAASTRICHT AND BEYOND – THE EMERGENCE OF THE EU 
 In December 1991, the Maastricht Treaty on European Union (TEU) was signed 
after weeks of meetings and intergovernmental negotiations.  The TEU marked the birth 
of the European Union and its three-pillar structure.  The three pillars are the European 
Community (EC) for economic and social affairs, the Common Foreign and Security 
Policy (CFSP) for security and foreign policy issues, and the Justice and Home Affairs 
(JHA) pillar for legal issues.18  The Maastricht Treaty was clearly not the first significant 
step taken towards European integration in the twentieth century.  In fact, efforts at 
                                                 
14 Ibid. 
15 Ibid., emphasis in the original. 
16 Ibid., 17. 
17 Ibid. 
18 George and Bache, 124. 
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integration began in 1951 when the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) was 
established.  However, Maastricht made possible a level of integration that had not been 
seen previously in the decades following World War II.   
Of particular interest in defense circles was the CFSP and the idea of a common 
defense policy among the EU members.  Maastricht did not set specific criteria or 
requirements for an EU military capability.  According to Article 14, 
1. The common foreign and security policy shall include all questions 
related to the security of the Union, including the eventual framing of a 
common defence policy, which might in time lead to a common defence. 
 
2. The Union requests the Western European Union (WEU), which is an 
integral part of the development of the Union, to elaborate and implement 
decisions and actions of the Union which have defence implications. The 
Council shall, in agreement with the institutions of the WEU, adopt the 
necessary practical arrangements.19 
In other words, the Maastricht TEU gave the WEU the responsibility for EU 
military matters, and this contributed to a revitalization of the older and infrequently 
called upon organization.  At this time (and in fact to this day) the WEU and the EU were 
separate institutions, but agreement between them was facilitated by the fact that all 
WEU members are members of the EU.  Article 17 of the amended TEU further clarifies 
that agreement. 
It [the WEU] supports the Union in framing the defence aspects of the 
common foreign and security policy as set out in this Article.  The Union 
shall accordingly foster closer institutional relations with the WEU with a 
view to the possibility of the integration of the WEU into the Union, 
should the European Council so decide.20 
 
Although such a dramatic step was not actually approved by the member 
governments, this proposal showed the willingness of the EU leaders to take over many 
of the roles filled by the WEU.  Rather than rely upon an outside organization whenever 
security concerns arose, the EU was hoping to acquire this capability within its own 
organizational structures.  Just as in the WEU, however, had the EU absorbed the WEU 
structures, member nations would still have been the ultimate decision makers concerning 
the contribution of forces to any military operation.                                                    
19 Maastricht Treaty on European Union, Brussels, 12 February 1992, European Union: Selected 
Instruments Taken from the Treaties, Book I, Vol. I (Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the 
European Communities, 1999), 654. 
20 Ibid., 38-39, emphasis added. 
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 On 2 October 1997, the members of the EU signed the Treaty of Amsterdam.  
This treaty included many additions and amendments to the earlier Maastricht TEU.  The 
Treaty of Amsterdam was significant, among other reasons, because it incorporated the 
“Petersberg Tasks” from the earlier WEU Petersberg Declaration of 19 June 1992.  As 
noted in Chapter I, these tasks consist of “humanitarian and rescue tasks, peacekeeping 
tasks, and tasks of combat forces in crisis management including peacemaking.”  With 
this change to the original TEU in place, the likelihood that the EU would develop a 
capability to perform these tasks further increased.  French motivations alone, however, 
could not make the pursuit of an ESDP a reality.  The true key to the process would be 
the United Kingdom.  If the UK got behind the idea of building an ESDP with an EU 
military capability, the initiative would have a much better chance of coming to fruition.  
However, until late 1998 British policy regarding European defense and security 
arrangements differed from that of the French. 
D. THE UNITED KINGDOM—KEY TO THE PROCESS 
Whereas France has consistently played the role of protagonist regarding ESDP and an 
autonomous EU military capability, until 1998 the United Kingdom opposed endowing the EU 
with military security functions.  After World War II, the UK enjoyed a renewed and intensified 
positive relationship with the United States on many fronts.  This “special relationship,” as it was 
soon to be called, has helped to keep the trans-Atlantic bond strong between the United States and 
the rest of Europe.  The 1956 Suez Crisis did not scar relations between the UK and the United 
States to the same degree as it did relations between Washington and Paris.  In the end, President 
Eisenhower referred to the crisis as a “family spat,” indicating the rapid improvement in relations 
between the governments of the United States and the United Kingdom.21   
Throughout the Cold War, the British never wavered in their commitment to 
NATO.  When proposals for an autonomous EU military capability first arose, the British 
were quick to reaffirm their commitment to a “NATO first” policy.  From 1990 to 1998 
the efforts to create a stronger European pillar within NATO led primarily to institutional 
adjustments.  When the focus of many Europeans shifted to the ESDP in light of the new 
British policy in 1998, the British were quick to reassure the Americans that an EU 
capacity for autonomous action would be pursued not to compete with NATO, but rather 
                                                 
21 Ibid., 98. 
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to supplement and strengthen the trans-Atlantic partnership.22  Phrases such as “where 
the Alliance as a whole is not engaged” dominated British government literature on the 
subject.23   
Though the UK chose not to adopt the euro, unprecedented military cooperation 
within the EU was not out of the question.  Blair’s turnaround came about from briefings 
he received in the spring of 1998 that showed how dependent Europe would be on US 
military support in the event of a crisis in Kosovo.24  As the threat of war loomed in 
Kosovo, doubts were raised about the US commitment to the region.  Only a few months 
before Operation Allied Force began in March 1999, Tony Blair did an about face with 
respect to ESDP.   The resulting declaration at St. Malo in December 1998 brought 
together French and now British aspirations for an autonomous EU military capability.   
E. FROM ST. MALO TO THE HELSINKI HEADLINE GOAL 
On 3-4 December 1998, French President Jacques Chirac, French Prime Minister 
Lionel Jospin, and British Prime Minister Tony Blair met at a regular bilateral summit in 
St. Malo to discuss the future of European defense and security arrangements.  The 
resulting Joint Declaration was a landmark document that represented a fundamental 
change in the UK’s stance toward an autonomous EU military capability.  The document 
states that the EU “must have the capacity for autonomous military action, backed up by 
credible military forces, the means to decide to use them, and a readiness to do so, in 
order to respond to international crises.”25  Before the EU could capitalize on the efforts 
of France and the UK, Operation Allied Force soon began in Kosovo and NATO aircraft 
took to the skies for 78 days of bombing.  Tony Blair’s worst fears were realized with 
Milošević’s actions to kill and expel the Kosovar Albanians, and the resulting NATO operation 
confirmed the European dependence on US military capabilities.  So dependent on the United 
States were the European NATO allies that Tony Blair described the European reaction to the 
crisis in Kosovo as being one of “weakness and confusion.”26   
                                                 
22 Gunning, 6. 
23 Ibid. 
24 Phillip Gordon, “Their Own Army? Making European Defense Work,” Foreign Affairs, July/August 2000, 
12. 
25 St. Malo Joint Declaration, in Rutten, Chaillot Paper No. 47, 8. 
26 Blair quoted in Stephen Hoadley, “Europe’s Rapid Reaction Force,” New Zealand International Review, 1 
July 2001, 23. 
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The glaringly obvious and growing gap between European and US military capabilities 
was visible for the entire world to see, and Tony Blair was not pleased.  Blair was also upset with 
the reluctance and hesitancy the United States had shown in getting involved again in the former 
Yugoslavia.  As Jolyon Howorth, a British scholar in international security studies, has written, 
The divergent interpretations of that crisis, and particularly of the ways to 
deal with it, which marked the responses of, on the one hand, the United 
States, and, on the other hand, the principal countries of the European 
Union, led political leaders in Europe to look afresh at the entire structure 
of EU-US relations. Nowhere was this process more far-reaching than in 
London, where Tony Blair, anxious to carve out some European role for 
the United Kingdom, looked on with growing frustration as his friend Bill 
Clinton, guided and advised by Richard Holbrooke, stumbled from one 
unsatisfactory approach to Belgrade to another, while Europe attempted 
vainly to rattle sabres that hardly existed. The Atlantic Alliance, it was 
concluded in London, was in serious trouble.27 
 
The US hesitations before Allied Force and the comparative weakness of the Europeans 
during the operation made the pursuit of an ESDP seem imperative yet difficult to achieve.  
ESDP would be crucial should the United States choose not to take action in future military 
contingencies in Europe, but Allied Force had shown that the European Union would be unable 
to conduct similar operations on its own.  The EU accordingly decided to continue its efforts to 
develop the ESDP.  The EU was quick to build upon the foundation recently laid by the 
Franco-British Summit at St. Malo in December 1998.  At the Cologne meeting of the 
European Council on 3-4 June 1999 (days before the conclusion of Allied Force on 10 
June) a Declaration was issued that made the development of an EU military capability 
almost inevitable: 
We, the members of the European Council, are resolved that the European 
Union shall play its full role on the international stage.  To that end, we 
intend to give the European Union the necessary means and capabilities to 
assume its responsibilities regarding a common European policy on 
security and defence.28 
With this statement, the groundwork for the eventual European Security and Defense 
Policy (ESDP) was laid, and the Headline Goal would soon follow.  The next step was to 
articulate the need for operational capability with greater specificity.  
                                                 
27 Howorth, 25. 
28 Declaration of the European Council on Strengthening the Common European Policy on Security 
and Defence, 3-4 June 1999, in Rutten, Chaillot Paper No. 47, 41. 
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The European Council’s Helsinki meeting of 10-11 December 1999 laid out the 
criteria for the Headline Goal.   The final report listed the following criteria for the 
operational arm of the ESDP: 
• cooperating voluntarily in EU-led operations, Member States must be 
able, by 2003, to deploy within 60 days and sustain for at least 1 year 
military forces of up to 50,000-60,000 persons capable of the full range of 
Petersberg tasks; 
• new political and military bodies and structures will be established 
within the Council to enable the Union to ensure the necessary political 
guidance and strategic direction to such operations, while respecting the 
single institutional framework;  
• modalities will be developed for full consultation, cooperation and 
transparency between the EU and NATO, taking into account the needs of 
all EU Member States;  
• appropriate arrangements will be defined that would allow, while 
respecting the Union’s decision-making autonomy, non-EU European 
NATO members and other interested States to contribute to EU military 
crisis management;  
• a non-military crisis management mechanism will be established to 
coordinate and make more effective the various civilian means and 
resources, in parallel with the military ones, at the disposal of the Union 
and the Member States.29 
 
With this document, the operational arm of the ESDP was for the first time given 
specific criteria and guidelines.  It is in Annex I to Annex IV of the document that the 
term “headline goal” is actually used.30  (Nowhere in the document is the term “rapid 
reaction force” used, although this expression is employed by journalists to refer to the 
Headline Goal force.)  The EU outlined in the Headline Goal the capabilities it deemed 
necessary to conduct the Petersberg Tasks.  Now it was up to the EU member states to 
                                                 
29 Presidency Progress Report to the Helsinki European Council on Strengthening the Common 
European Policy on Security and Defence, 10-11 December 1999, in Rutten, Chaillot Paper No. 47, 82. 
30 Annex I to Annex IV also includes the following statement on military capabilities for the 
fulfillment of the Petersberg Tasks: “These forces should be militarily self-sustaining with the necessary 
command, control and intelligence capabilities, logistics, other combat support services and additionally, as 
appropriate, air and naval elements. Member States should be able to deploy in full at this level within 60 
days, and within this to provide smaller rapid response elements available and deployable at very high 
readiness. They must be able to sustain such a deployment for at least one year. This will require an 
additional pool of deployable units (and supporting elements) at lower readiness to provide replacements 
for the initial forces,” in ibid., 85. 
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agree upon who was going to supply this force and what exactly was going to be 
supplied.    
F. COMMITTING THE CAPABILITIES 
To determine how the Headline Goal would be supplied, the EU held a 
Capabilities Commitment Conference (CCC) in Brussels on 20 November 2000, almost a 
year after the Headline Goal had been announced.  At a preparatory meeting before the 
CCC, it was agreed that the requirements for the Headline Goal as determined in Helsinki 
implied the following military capabilities: 
• “more than 500 kinds of land-, air- and naval units,” as well as “key or 
strategic capacities” in seven areas: “C3I, ISTAR, Deployability and 
Mobility, Effective Engagement, Protection and Survivability, 
Sustainability and Logistics, and General Support”; 
• an 80,000 man strong land force (to enable a force of 60,000 to operate); 
• an air element of “between 300 and 350 fighter planes”; 
• a naval element of “80 ships.”31 
Though the EU has not published the specific contributions to the force catalogue, Table 
1 is a list of estimated contributions.  Since the CCC, the numbers have fluctuated.  
However, the total number of forces pledged has remained somewhat constant.  See 







                                                 
31 Report on the presidency before the press.  Informal meeting of Defence Ministers at Eouen, 22 
September 2000, as referenced in Frans Osinga, “European Defence, Does Anyone Really Care?,” in 
Fabien Terpan, ed., Europe as a Military Power, unpublished, June 2002, manuscript, p.3, forthcoming.  
Quoted with author’s permission.  C3I stands for Command, Control, Communications, and Information.  
ISTAR stands for Intelligence, Surveillance, Target Acquisition, and Reconnaissance. 
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EU Member Initial Contribution to Force Catalogue 
United Kingdom 20,000 troops, 72 combat aircraft, 18 ships 
France 12,000 troops, 70 combat aircraft, 2 AWACS, 30 UAV’s, 
warships (to include 1 carrier) 
Germany 13,500 – 18,000 troops 
Italy 6,000 troops 
Belgium 1,000 troop mechanized brigade, 1 F-16 squadron, 
unspecified number of naval vessels 
Netherlands 5,000 troops 
Luxembourg 500 troops 
Sweden 2,000 troops 
Ireland 1,000 troops 
Greece 3,000 troops 
Spain 6,000 troops 
Portugal 1,000 troops 
Austria Unspecified number of troops 
Finland 2,000 troops 
Denmark No contribution 
T1: Initial Contributions to the Force Catalogue32 
                                                 
32 Suzanne Himes, “NATO and the European Union’s Emerging Security Role,” Thesis (Monterey: 
Naval Postgraduate School, March 2001), 41. 
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 At the CCC, Denmark abstained from contributing forces to the Force Catalogue, 
referencing Protocol 5 to the 1997 Treaty of Amsterdam—that is, the “Protocol on the 
position of Denmark.” 
Denmark does not participate in the elaboration and the implementation of 
decisions and actions of the Union which have defence implications, but 
will not prevent the development of closer cooperation between Member 
States in this area.  Therefore Denmark shall not participate in their 
adoption.  Denmark shall not be obliged to contribute to the financing of 
operational expenditure arising from such measures.33 
Therefore, it was clear well before the CCC that Denmark would not contribute forces to 
the ESDP.  Copenhagen believes that the EU should leave defense concerns to NATO, 
and instead concentrate on civil approaches to peacekeeping and conflict resolution.  
Polls in Denmark show a populace opposed (as high as 66 percent in some surveys) to the 
European Union “creating its own armed force.” 34      
When these figures are added up (even without Denmark), the result is a land 
force of more than 100,000 troops, approximately 400 combat aircraft and 100 naval 
vessels, which (by numbers alone) actually exceeds the requirements called for in the 
Headline Goal.  The EU subsequently issued a Military Capabilities Commitment 
Declaration stating these figures and announcing that they made “it possible fully to 
satisfy the needs identified to carry out the different types of crisis management missions 







                                                 
33 Protocol on the position of Denmark, Part II, Article 6, in European Union: Selected Instruments 
Taken from the Treaties, Book I, Vol. I (Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European 
Communities, 1999), 425. 
34 Jolyon Howorth, European Integration and Defence: The Ultimate Challenge, Chaillot Paper No. 
43, 46. 
35 Military Capabilities Commitment Declaration, 20-21 November 2000, in Rutten, Chaillot Paper 





































 According to Annex II to the Presidency Conclusions of the 2001 Laeken 
European Council: 
Through the continuing development of the ESDP, the strengthening of its 
capabilities, both civil and military, and the creation of the appropriate EU 
structures, the EU is now able to conduct some crisis-management 
operations.  The Union will be in a position to take on progressively more 
demanding operations, as the assets and capabilities at its disposal 
continue to develop.  Decisions to make use of this ability will be taken in 
light of the circumstances of each particular situation, a determining factor 
being the assets and capabilities available. 36 
This statement was widely interpreted by journalists as a declaration of “operational” 
capability for the ESDP.  However, it is clear that the conclusions from Laeken refer only 
to an ability to “conduct some crisis-management operations.”  What exactly does it 
mean to be able to conduct “some” operations?  What could these operations entail, and 
which of the Petersberg Tasks do they include?  The EU member countries have pledged 
the troops necessary to meet the force requirements of the Headline Goal, but what will 
these troops and assets really be capable of doing?   
In spite of this noteworthy organizational development, the European Allies—of 
which eleven are members of the European Union—still remain heavily dependent on 
NATO and the United States in particular for their defense needs.37  Aside from France, 
Greece, the United Kingdom, and a few other exceptions, European Union members and 
NATO European countries are not increasing their defense budgets. Nor are most of the 
EU nations procuring the necessary equipment and demonstrating a determination to 
sustain the Headline Goal forces without dedicated NATO support.   
                                                 
36 Declaration on the Operational Capability of the Common European Security and Defence Policy, 
in Rutten, Chaillot Paper No. 51, 120, emphasis added. 
37 The NATO European Allies in the EU are: Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, 
Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, and the United Kingdom.  The non-NATO members of the EU 
are: Austria, Finland, Ireland, and Sweden.   
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In addition to various shortfalls in capability, the number of forces called for in 
the Headline Goal is probably too small to accomplish at least some of the middle to 
upper level Petersberg tasks, which are themselves ill-defined and open to interpretation 
by EU members.  Recent military operations in the Balkans and Afghanistan demonstrate 
that the EU would be ill-equipped to deal with the most demanding modern military 
contingencies.  Although the EU is considering using some of the forces pledged to the 
Headline Goal in the near future, considerable obstacles lie in the way of assembling an 
EU force for major operations.  The EU countries are simply not spending enough on 
their military forces and not procuring the assets necessary to support anything but the 
smaller Petersberg tasks.  What the EU professes to want to do and what it will actually 
be able to do may therefore differ.   
B. THE HEADLINE GOAL—IS IT ENOUGH? 
The numbers outlined in December 1999 at Helsinki were easily met by the 
contributions pledged in the subsequent Force Catalogue, which totaled over 100,000 
troops, 400 aircraft, and 100 ships.38  However, the first real obstacle to the European 
Union achieving a truly operational force lies in the “rule of 3’s.”  The rule of 3’s 
concerns the lifecycle of any combat force, the three phases of:  preparing and training 
for deployment, conducting the deployment, and recovery after deployment.39  Given this 
time-tested rule of force planning, the actual force required would be much greater than 
60,000 troops and the associated assets.  The Headline Goal actually states that the force 
“will require an additional pool of deployable units (and supporting elements) at lower 
readiness to provide replacements for the initial forces.”40   
Although the drafters of the Headline Goal are hinting here at the rule of 3’s, they 
do not go so far as to specify just how many troops in addition to the 60,000 would have 
to be earmarked for the force.  Estimates taking this reality into consideration generate 
much more daunting numbers.  The Army forces would require 200,000 to 230,000 
                                                 
38 Military Capabilities Commitment Declaration, 20-21 November 2000, in Rutten, Chaillot Paper 
No. 47, 160. 
39 Achieving the Helsinki Headline Goals (London: Centre for Defence Studies, King’s College, 
2001), 9. 
40 Presidency Progress Report to the Helsinki European Council on Strengthening the Common 
European Policy on Security and Defence, Annex I to Annex IV, Helsinki, 10-11 December 1999, in 
Rutten, Chaillot Paper No. 47, 85. 
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troops, broken into thirds for combat, combat support, and logistics.41  One corps (15 
brigades) would be engaged in the operation, one corps in training, and one corps in 
recovery.  The Air Force would require 300 to 350 combat aircraft comprising 8 or 9 
wings, plus 180 or so support aircraft to include air-to-air refuelers, long-range cargo, 
reconnaissance, etc.42  Adequate naval forces require three to four task groups of around 
20 frigates each, or 1 aircraft carrier plus about 15 frigates if a nation has a carrier 
available.43  Given these numbers, it does not seem impossible for the fourteen 
participating EU nations to gather the necessary men and materiel for the Headline Goal 
force.  After all, in February 1996 President Chirac of France said that similar numbers 
would be the targets for a purely French deployable and sustainable force.44  However, 
when the actual professional and deployable forces are added up, a force of 180,000 
troops constitutes 21% out of an available pool of 830,000.45  Earmarking over one-fifth 
the available EU member troops for the Headline Goal is not impossible, but is certainly 
a commitment that could prove quite daunting if national assets are already committed 
elsewhere. 
C. THE VAGUENESS OF THE “PETERSBERG TASKS” 
The deployment of the Headline Goal force would not be as difficult if smaller 
groups were deployed in lieu of the whole force of 60,000 troops.  After all, are not some 
of the Petersberg Tasks peacekeeping, humanitarian tasks, search and rescue, and crisis 
management missions?  The “peacemaking” aspect of the Petersberg Tasks could involve 
separating warring parties and disarming belligerent units, and missions of this type could 
well require most if not all the forces pledged to the force catalogue.  Nonetheless, why 
would lower level Petersberg Tasks (with less likelihood of armed engagements) require 
a whole corps sized force?  The problem is that “Petersberg Task” operations of the same 
category might require significantly different force levels.   
                                                 
41 Howorth, 39-40. 
42 Ibid. 
43 Ibid. 
44 David Yost, “The NATO Capabilities Gap and the European Union,” Survival, vol. 42, no. 4.  
(Winter 2000-01), 117. 
45 Achieving the Helsinki Headline Goals, 9. 
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This is where another difficulty with the Headline Goal emerges—definitional 
ambiguities in the Petersberg tasks.  The Petersberg tasks were defined only in terms of 
function, meaning tasks to be performed and jobs to be done.46  Because they were not 
distinguished by the different levels of military force required to complete the mission, a 
great deal of confusion has arisen over what constitutes a “lower,” “middle,” and “upper” 
level Petersberg task.47  Whereas a state with considerable military capability like France 
may well view an operation as demanding as Desert Storm as an acceptable upper-level 
Petersberg task, states such as Germany, Sweden, and the Netherlands, while all 
possessing sophisticated military forces, reportedly deem the NATO operations in the 
Kosovo conflict as about as upper-level as they would envisage.48   
This creates a problematic situation.  The EU is not in charge of planning for its 
members’ military forces and what types of contingencies they train and equip for.  The 
14 EU nations participating in the ESDP may therefore have different ideas on what the 
Petersberg tasks could really entail.49  The relationship between the Headline Goal and 
the Petersberg tasks is therefore best conceived as being circular: the force levels planned 
are derived from a sense of the Petersberg tasks, and the tasks the EU is prepared to 
undertake will be limited to those that can be achieved with the force capabilities in 
existence.50  In essence, they plan for what they envision reacting to, but can only react to 
that for which they have planned. 
                                                 
46 Ibid., 11. 
47 Ibid. 
48 Ibid., 16. 
49 In order to provide nations with better ideas on what to expect for each Petersberg Task, the WEU 
listed specific missions that the Petersberg Tasks could entail: (1) Evacuation, unopposed or opposed: 
Natural or Man-made Disaster, Hostile Environment for European Citizens.  (2) Humanitarian Tasks: 
Specialized Assistance and Logistic Support Operations, Security Operations, Combined 
Assistance/Logistic Support and Security Operations.  (3) Peacekeeping: Observation, Monitoring, 
Supervision of Protected Areas, Conflict Prevention (preventive deployment), Guarantee and Denial of 
Movement, Military Assistance, Demobilization, Interposition, Humanitarian Assistance.  (4) Peace 
Enforcement: Deterrence, Enforcement of Sanctions, Containment, Incidental Coercive Measures (Peace 
Restoration, Humanitarian Intervention, Establishment/Maintenance of Protected Areas, Guarantee and 
Denial of Movement, Separation of Belligerents Using Force, and Liberation of Occupied Territory).  
Western European Union, 19 April 1998.  Cited in Gert R. Polli, “The European Security and Defense 
Identity: A Challenge for NATO and the United States,” Thesis (Monterey: Naval Postgraduate School, 
March 2001), 42. 
50 Achieving the Helsinki Headline Goals, 12. 
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The whole debate about defining the upper limits of the Petersberg tasks may be 
pointless if the EU is unable to generate the necessary forces to engage in these tasks.  
The European Union currently lacks the strategic airlift to carry out some of the lower 
level Petersberg tasks (e.g., large-scale disaster relief in Africa, or peacekeeping in 
Southeast Asia).  In subsequent deliberations, the participating EU nations broke the 
December 1999 Headline Goal into 144 specific requirements, with US assistance still 
needed to meet 55 of them by late 2001.51   
At the 19 November 2001 Capabilities Improvement Conference (CIC) in 
Brussels, a new plan to address these shortfalls was adopted.  Called the European 
Capabilities Action Plan (ECAP), this plan outlined 40 specific shortfalls and asked 
member states to develop their own plans to address them.  ECAP was able to formally 
secure the commitment of EU members to either take the lead in addressing certain 
capabilities, or to be an observer to the process.  Appendix I lists all 40 capabilities in 
which the EU is deficient and the states that have signed up to address them.  
Nonetheless, at the December 2001 Capabilities Commitment Conference in Brussels, 
EU experts estimated that assistance from the United States would still be needed to fill 
about 50 requirements, which could cost up to £8.5 billion to acquire.52  Many of the 
capabilities, such as strategic airlift, sealift, aerial refueling, satellite communications, 
and suppression of enemy air defenses (SEAD), encompassed by ECAP will take years to 
develop.53  In some cases, these capabilities will not be in hand until 2008 or later. 
Given the current rate of progress, the EU may be unable to engage in more than 
the lower-end Petersberg Tasks without the US support that some EU members were 
hoping to avoid relying on with this autonomous force.  The most significant shortfalls 
have also been the most obvious—long-range air and sealift, force protection, precision 
munitions, standoff weaponry, logistics, etc.  The inability of some NATO European 
military establishments to significantly contribute to the NATO air operations in the 
                                                 
51 Smith, 16. 
52 Ibid. 
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former Yugoslavia highlighted some of these shortfalls, but few have been substantially 
resolved.   
The participating EU members had also hoped to announce at the Laeken Summit 
that they had reached an agreement with NATO on the sharing of NATO assets.   Since 
11 of NATO’s members are also members of the EU, an EU-NATO asset-sharing 
arrangement would be advantageous.  However, continuing Turkish-Greek differences 
have prevented approval of such an arrangement.54  Even if this agreement had been 
reached, however, some of the capabilities that the European Union is seeking are not 
NATO assets, but sovereign US military assets.  The only option left for the European 
Union countries concerned is actually to procure this equipment.  The current political 
climate in Europe has, however, reflected an unwillingness to do so. 
D. A LACK OF FUNDING 
Shrinking defense budgets have been the hallmark of European militaries in the 
last decade.  The London-based International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) has 
concluded that European defense spending has fallen in real terms by 5% per year, with R&D 
spending falling by 2% per year, and procurement spending dropping by 6.9% since 1996.55  In 
dollar terms, defense spending in the three largest economies in the EU (France, Germany, and 
the UK) fell by an average of 14.7% between 1998 and 2000.56  In order to procure the 
equipment that is vital to equip any EU force, this dismal budgetary performance simply cannot 
continue.  To what extent do the Europeans really need to spend more?  They already spend 
almost 60% of what the United States spends on defense, and they only seek to play a regional 
role, whereas the United States plays a global one.57   
Evidence suggests that the Europeans need to spend more wisely in addition to simply 
more on defense.  A RAND study concluded that funds could be freed up in a “reallocation of 
existing military spending and military investments from their somewhat ‘backward-looking’ 
focus—for example, on heavy tanks, artillery, surface ships, etc., all relating to World War II 
imagery—to a more forward-looking, high-technology, C4I, air-mobile, and deployable set of                                                  
54 Nicholas Fiorenza, “Capabilities Summit: NATO Plans to Exit the Prague Summit Not Only Bigger but 
Better,” Armed Forces Journal International, August 2002, 38. 
55 John D. Morrocco, “Allies’ Capability Gap Finds No Easy Solution,” Aviation Week and Space 
Technology, 18 June 2001, 137. 
56 The Military Balance 2001-2002 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2001), 290. 
57 Howorth, 41. 
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capabilities.”58  In essence, spending existing funds more wisely requires their dedication to 
capabilities more relevant to the fulfillment of the Headline Goal, not Cold War defense 
postures.  The study, however, recognized an unwillingness to reallocate funds.  Such 
sentiment was typified by a French Army colonel who said, “About the reallocation, I don’t see 
what can be done to allow [for a] shift of money of this magnitude.  The European armies are 
very rigid organizations.”59 
Spending more wisely also requires, in addition to overcoming institutional rigidity, 
new methods of EU member military procurement.  Support for independent national defense 
industries, especially in France, Germany, Italy, and the UK, has resulted in duplication of 
costly research and development (R&D) programs, relatively short production runs, and small 
national orders.60  Even though the UK introduced the “smart procurement” process in the 
1998 Strategic Defence Review, the program has apparently yet to produce any gains in 
efficiency.  The UK’s National Audit Office reported that the UK’s 25 major defence projects 
were running $2.7 billion over budget and roughly four years late.61  Professor Keith Hartley of 
the University of York has estimated that if procurement were on a competitive and 
supranational basis, with open, liberalized, and competitive bidding, the resulting annual 
savings in defense procurement would range from 10 percent to 17 percent, or from $10 billion 
to $15 billion annually.62  Such a move, though difficult and politically charged (especially 
when political constituencies who earn their living in the defense sector feel their jobs are being 
threatened by competition from other EU member nations), would free up existing funds and 
thereby substitute for an actual increase in defense spending.   
Even if the EU does reverse the trend in defense spending, though, how much can its 
member states expect to pay for the Headline Goal force?  Estimating the costs of the force is a 
difficult task because the participating states of the European Union have never had to pay for a 
force with this makeup and with this mission before.  Scholars at King’s College of London 
estimate that $42 billion will have to be spent on the necessary capabilities for the Headline 
                                                 
58 Charles Wolf Jr. and Benjamin Zycher, European Military Prospects, Economic Constraints, and 
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59 Ibid., emphasis in the original. 
60 Ibid., 34. 
61 The Military Balance 2001-2002, 34. 
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Goal over a 10 to 15 year period, which amounts to a collective 10% increase in EU investment 
in new military equipment.63  The RAND research group produced four estimates, of which 
one was a “bottom-up” approach estimating a cost of $37-47 billion, a “top-down” approach of 
$23.5-31.4 billion, one based on the costs of a US Marine Expeditionary Brigade of $52.4 
billion, and finally one based on the costs of a Mobile Advanced US Army Division of $35-56 
billion.64  It should be noted, however, that these estimates by RAND are only for the 
procurement of the necessary equipment, and neglect the additional cost of operations and 
maintenance costs, which increase the figures by an additional 30 to 50%.65   
Aside from treaty-writing and institutional innovations, few aspects of developing an 
operational ESDP are going to be economically easy for the Europeans.  The consequences of 
not spending the money to develop the necessary capabilities could be detrimental to trans-
Atlantic cooperation and European security.  In a January 2002 speech, NATO Secretary 
General Lord Robertson concluded that the long-term effects of diminishing capabilities could 
be severe.  
For all the political energy expended in NATO to implement the Defence 
Capabilities Initiative, and in the EU to push ahead with the 
complementary Headline Goal process, the truth is that mighty Europe 
remains a military pygmy.  Orders of battle and headquarters wiring 
diagrams read impressively. Overall numbers of soldiers, tanks and 
aircraft give a similar impression of military power. But the reality is that 
we are hard pressed to maintain about 50,000 European troops in the 
Balkans.  A new operation would oblige most non-US NATO countries to 
slash their contingents in Bosnia, Kosovo and FYROM to produce usable 
forces in any numbers.66  
 
Whether the participating EU nations choose to address this problem will determine whether 
they will be able to actually conduct the types of operations that they propose, or whether they 
will remain the “military pygmy” depicted by the Secretary General.   
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27 
E. SO WHAT CAN THEY DO? 
Given that 2003 is not far off, what will the EU countries participating in the ESDP be 
able to do in the near future with operational forces?  Already throughout Europe, many EU 
members are engaged in Petersberg type missions under different auspices and agencies.  
Whether they are with NATO, the OSCE, or one of the various multilateral and bilateral 
agreements between European countries, European forces are not unfamiliar with Petersberg 
type tasks.  It is the coming together under the command of the EU that would be foreign to 
these militaries.  Local search and rescue, peacekeeping, disaster relief, and other traditionally 
lower-level missions are within the conceivable spectrum of operations.  However, given that 
many countries are already engaged through different institutions, contributing to the EU as 
well could prove to be too demanding, as indicated by Lord Robertson.  Some of the smaller 
countries, including the four which are either neutral or non-aligned, can supply high quality 
and highly trained specialists for such contingencies.  The problem is that if an EU member can 
only contribute a limited number of troops to the force catalogue (as Ireland, Luxembourg, and 
Portugal have, with 1,000 or fewer troops pledged to the catalogue) one operation may be about 
all that it could sustain.  The EU could therefore face considerable difficulty in getting countries 
other than the major contributors, such as France, Germany, and the UK, to contribute forces 
for a lower-level Petersberg task.   
Additionally, unlike purely national forces, multinational land forces are by their nature 
less efficient and effective due to problems with language, different weapons systems, 
organization, logistics, and standard operating procedures.67  The assembled EU troops could 
have a combined effect less than might be achieved by nationally homogenous forces of the 
same size.  Although the political incentives to take action jointly could well outweigh these 
operational concerns, one has to consider these problems of interoperability when assessing the 
effectiveness of the forces that could be placed in combat.   
Also, should the EU be able to assemble enough national contributions for a crisis 
management mission, the concept of transfer of command from sovereign nations to a supra-
national authority has always been an emotionally and legally heated issue.68  Often, national 
governments have imposed considerable restrictions on such moves, and there is no doubt that 
                                                 
67 Thomas-Durell Young, Multinational Land Forces and the NATO Force Structure Review, (U.S. 
Army War College: Strategic Studies Institute, 2000), 5. 
68 Ibid. 
28 
the use of sovereign forces to pursue missions deemed necessary by the European Union would 
create intense scrutiny, if not outright hostility, for the EU by some constituencies (even though 
arrangements are being made at an inter-governmental level).    One of the reasons why the 
Irish people rejected the Nice Treaty in a national referendum was concern about Irish forces 
operating under an EU flag.  Command and control concerns have not significantly hindered 
NATO’s operations; but NATO has also had over 50 years to work out the details of such 
moves and to a great degree national forces remain under sovereign national control in the 
NATO system.   
Further adding to the problem of assembling forces under the EU is the limited 
availability of combat services support formations.  While 14 EU member nations are willing 
to contribute to the Headline Goal force catalogue, combat services support troops are often 
considered rare national treasures to be deployed only when absolutely required.69  Since many 
nations are already engaged abroad, they may be unwilling to commit combat services support 
assets to EU operations when they could be needed in some other operation.  This could create 
a problem for the EU in some circumstances in that the contributions the EU receives from its 
member nations might not be the full complement of troops necessary for a certain mission.  
Given all these problems, the EU may in some circumstances face considerable difficulty in 
assembling a force for even lower level Petersberg tasks.  While the armed forces of EU 
member states are fully trained to participate in such tasks, national priorities could limit what 
EU nations choose to contribute to specific EU operations.  Since even lower level tasks could 
present problems for the EU, recent military operations demonstrating the need for capabilities 
associated with middle and upper level Petersberg tasks serve to further highlight how difficult 
crisis management operations may be for the EU, at least under certain conditions. 
F. RECENT CONTINGENCIES—BENCHMARKS FOR PLANNING 
The recent examples of military action that influenced the EU members in defining the 
Headline Goal were the operations under NATO command in the former Yugoslavia.  The 
operations of the future may not be conducted like the wars of the last decade.  However, the 
manning levels and capabilities of the forces involved in these operations show what could be 
required of the EU in the future, especially considering that the following missions are the types 
of tasks that many EU nations want the Headline Goal forces to perform.  The first example is 
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the Implementation Force (IFOR) that was placed in Bosnia in December 1995.  Following the 
Dayton Peace Accords, IFOR had a one-year mandate to “oversee implementation of the 
military aspects of the peace agreement—bringing about and maintaining an end to hostilities; 
separating the armed forces of Bosnia’s two newly created entities, the Federation of Bosnia 
and Herzegovina and Republika Srpska; transferring territory between the two entities 
according to the peace agreement; and moving the parties’ forces and heavy weapons into 
approved storage sites.”70  IFOR’s mandate certainly included many aspects of peace 
enforcement.  At the start of the IFOR operation, there were 60,000 troops in Bosnia, and (as 
noted earlier) their mandate lasted one year.71  This force size and duration are notably similar 
to the Headline Goal requirements.   
On 20 December 1996, the Stabilisation Force (SFOR) replaced IFOR.72  SFOR, 
operating in a more permissive environment, was charged with preserving the secure 
environment (that is, peacekeeping) and has even been able to assist in civil administration and 
military reform.73  Between December 1996 and November 1999, about 32,000 troops were 
deployed in SFOR.74  That level is currently around 20,000.  How does this example relate to 
the Headline Goal?  Simply stated, planning for operations of only one year in duration is rather 
optimistic, especially for peacekeeping operations.  In March 1999 when Operation Allied 
Force began, over three years after IFOR began operations, there were still 30,000 troops on the 
ground in Bosnia under General Montgomery Meigs’ command.75  As noted earlier, SFOR is 
still in Bosnia, with a strength of 20,000 troops.  The fact that the NATO-led force for Bosnia 
was initially the same size as that required by the Headline Goal but has been deployed for over 
six years (although at decreased force levels) does not bode well for the Headline Goal and its 
one year timeframe.  It would be unrealistic for EU members to anticipate their participation in 
only one of the Petersberg Tasks at a time and to assume that such participation would be of 
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finite and predictable duration.  If EU members contribute to a higher level Petersberg Task 
(such as peacemaking), they should realize that middle and lower level Petersberg Tasks may 
follow.   
The next major operation was Allied Force, NATO’s intervention in the Kosovo 
conflict.  Allied Force does not demonstrate the need for troops as much as it does for well-
equipped air forces, sustainability, and modern technology.  78 days after the bombing began 
on 24 March 1999, over 900 aircraft had been involved in the operation, of which over two-
thirds were American.76  By the end of the operation, over 38,000 sorties had been flown, and 
half of those sorties were flown by US Air Force F-16’s and F-117’s.  Precision guided 
munitions, an area in which most European Allies were poorly equipped to contribute, 
comprised 34% of the 23,000 weapons delivered.  The United States contributed 98% of the 
aerial refueling capability and airlifted over 78,000 tons of supplies and 42,380 people.  While 
the European Allies contributed many fighter and attack aircraft, they failed to provide any 
suitable long-range cargo aircraft, a capability that would be needed for many Petersberg 
Tasks.  By the end of the operation, the cost was estimated at over $5.5 billion for the US 
taxpayers—an amount that suggests how much more the EU would have to pay to mount such 
an operation on an autonomous basis.77   
Operation Allied Force was won through a superior American military contribution 
that compensated for the European allies’ inability to provide the requisite military might and 
technological prowess.  Had the EU nations wished to conduct an operation such as Allied 
Force on their own, there is little evidence that the approximately 400 aircraft pledged to the 
force catalogue would have been able to sustain such an operation.  In fact, a French source has 
estimated that had Allied Force been conducted without an American contribution, the 
Europeans would have lost 20 to 30 aircraft during the hostilities.78  Whether the European 
national constituencies would have accepted such losses or whether, at the sight of dozens of 
aircrews taken prisoner (and no doubt exploited by Milošević’s propaganda apparatus), they 
would have called upon their governments to cease military action is uncertain.  What is 
certain, however, is that (except for France) the European nations contributing to Allied Force 
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lacked the combat search and rescue (CSAR) assets necessary to deal with downed aircraft, and 
were consequently dependent on the United States to provide such a capability.79  The 
capabilities that the European Allies did bring to the table were often below US standards.  
European aircraft could make significant contributions in some circumstances, unless they were 
unable to fly in unfavorable weather, or drop ordinance precisely enough to adhere to 
requirements on avoiding collateral damage. 
The Kosovo Force (KFOR) troops were introduced in June 1999 soon after the 
cessation of hostilities by Milošević’s army.  It was originally envisioned that 28,000 
troops would be required to prevent the outbreak of further hostilities.80  By July 1999, 
these 28,000 troops had increased to a force of 33,000.81  In the following months the 
number grew to a corps sized formation of 55,000 troops.82  These numbers show that 
planners cannot call for a certain number of troops and expect requirements not to 
change.  In this case, if the EU members had been asked to provide all the troops for 
KFOR, the EU planners would have originally called for almost half of the number 
specified in the Headline Goal, but would have called only months later for almost the 
entire Headline Goal force instead.  Given the problems associated with assembling 
forces, it cannot be assumed that asking for a doubling of contributions would have been 
well received by the EU members.  Although EU members contributed more ground 
troops to KFOR than did the United States (the United States initially contributed only 
15% of the troops), NATO still relied upon the contributions of 19 Partnership for Peace 
(PfP) members and other nations to supply part of the 55,000.83  As of May 2000, EU 
member contributions to KFOR made up 63% of the total force.84  So, while EU member 
nations note that non-US forces make up a larger percentage of KFOR, many of these 
troops are also from non-EU members.  It should also be noted that it took five months to 
deploy some 40,000 European troops to support KFOR—a statistic that does not bode 
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well for the 60-day requirement for the Headline Goal force set forth in Helsinki in 
1999.85  NATO planners envisage reducing KFOR to 29,000 troops in June 2003, four 
years after the mission began.86 
It is even more disconcerting for the Headline Goal, however, to consider the plan 
for the use of ground troops before the aerial bombing campaign was decided upon.  The 
North Atlantic Council was unable to achieve consensus on the plan, but the NATO 
military authorities had devised a “forced entry” option calling for a force of 200,000 
troops to be put on the ground in Kosovo.87  By all estimates, there is no way that the EU 
could have provided that number of troops for an operation that some EU members do 
not even consider to be the highest level of Petersberg Task.88 
Most recently, the world has been witness to the war against terrorism and 
Operation Enduring Freedom.  By 11 September 2001, the European allies had still not 
taken many of the necessary steps to improve their capabilities (ECAP was implemented 
two months later).  Consequently, for most of the offensive aerial operations beginning in 
early October 2001 in Operation Enduring Freedom, EU members contributing to the war 
in Afghanistan were providing primarily supporting aerial assets.  Of the EU members, 
France and the UK have provided the most substantial combat assets.  France provided its 
only carrier battle group to support combat operations in the North Arabian Sea, and had 
flown 2,000 hours in support of Enduring Freedom as of June 2002.89  France did 
contribute six Mirage fighter-bombers to the campaign on 27 February 2002, which took 
part in bombing raids during Operation Anaconda; but the French were unable to supply 
a full squadron.90  The United Kingdom, in addition to contributing to the opening 
Tomahawk cruise missile strikes against terrorist training camps, provided air refueling 
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assets, airborne early warning (AEW), and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance 
(ISR) assets.91  These assets, however, were relatively limited in comparison with those 
furnished by the United States.  Although these supporting elements and limited combat 
assets definitely helped to enhance the combat capability of the coalition, the majority of 
the actual combat sorties was once again flown by the United States.   
Through February 2002, over 6,500 strike sorties had been flown by the United 
States out of a total of 21,500 American sorties.92  Compared to Operation Allied Force, 
fewer sorties were flown from October 2001 to February 2002 than during the 78 days of 
Allied Force.  However, in 6,500 US combat sorties over Afghanistan, 17,400 munitions 
were expended, compared with 23,000 munitions in 10,000 US sorties in the Kosovo 
conflict (the resulting ratios are 2.7 bombs per sortie in Afghanistan and 2.3 bombs per 
sortie in the Kosovo conflict).  However, while 34% of the 23,000 weapons used in 
Allied Force were precision guided, over 69% of the 17,400 dropped during Enduring 
Freedom (by late February 2002) have been precision guided.93  Because the proportion 
of precision munitions used has more than doubled and will no doubt increase, the 
European Union members are facing an ever-widening gap between American 
capabilities and their own.  Additionally, while some EU countries have placed limited 
numbers of forces on the ground in support of the International Security Assistance Force 
(ISAF), their lack of combat capabilities kept them far removed from the actual fighting 
being conducted by the American and Northern Alliance forces earlier in the war (British 
special forces being a notable exception).   
Of the 5,000 troops serving under the ISAF mandate, between 90 and 95% are 
from EU member countries.94  The ISAF mandate, which does not extend beyond the city 
of Kabul, was set to expire in May 2002, and in spite of desperate pleas from the EU 
envoy to extend the mandate and increase the force to 10,000, European countries were 
unwilling to commit more troops, especially the Germans and the British, who said that 
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they were overstretched.95  Only at the last minute were the Europeans able to contribute 
more troops to ISAF, keeping the force at 4,650.96  The UN Security Council voted to 
extend ISAF’s mandate for six months starting 20 June 2002, but it also rejected a request 
from interim president Hamid Karzai to deploy ISAF to other regions where the Afghani 
government faces threats from rival warlords.97  Thus, ISAF, which includes 1,387 
British and 1,056 German troops, was forced by the UN Security Council to remain in 
Kabul.98  If European governments are unwilling to increase support for this force, whose 
mission is of great importance to international security (and highly visible around the 
world), what does this say about the European willingness to accept significant security 
responsibilities?   
G. PROPOSED MISSIONS—TOO MUCH TOO FAST? 
In spite of the EU’s probable inability to carry out middle to upper level 
Petersberg tasks without substantial American support, the EU is nevertheless looking at 
deploying forces under EU command in the near future.  The EU is looking at taking over 
the international policing of Bosnia and Herzegovina by supplying 500 officers to replace 
the 2,000 officers of the UN International Police Task Force (IPTF) whose mandate 
expires at the end of 2002.99  While not traditional military troops, providing these police 
officers, also envisioned under the ESDP, will be a significant operational test of the 
EU’s new institutional mechanisms and will also reveal whether there is a commitment 
among the EU members for such operations.100   
However, the more significant push within the EU, especially by High 
Representative for the CFSP Javier Solana, is for the EU to take over the 1,000 soldier-
strong NATO mission Amber Fox in Macedonia.101  Amber Fox, whose mandate was set 
to expire on 26 June 2002, has already been led by a German officer and includes French, 
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Portuguese, Spanish, Greek, and Polish troops.102  To turn Amber Fox into an EU-led 
operation would not be very difficult, given the size and current make-up of the force, but 
it would still serve an important purpose in ensuring that further fighting does not break 
out in Macedonia.   
Even assuming responsibility for this small operation is meeting significant 
resistance among Europeans.  Some NATO European diplomats have reportedly voiced 
reservations about the changeover given the volatility of the situation.  Finland, Germany, 
Portugal, and the UK are reportedly also hesitant about the EU taking over the mission, 
with considerable political infighting occurring in Britain over the issue.103  This is 
especially alarming considering Britain’s earlier decision at St. Malo to reverse its 
previously unenthusiastic position toward giving military security functions to the EU.  
This lack of consensus does not bode well for the EU’s military aspirations given that it 
concerns the deployment of a force numbering around 1,000 troops. NATO was prepared 
to turn over the operation to the EU on 26 June 2002, but has instead left it under a Dutch 
NATO officer.104  However, disagreements among EU members and a lack of consensus 
have pushed the date for a possible changeover to 26 October 2002.105  Whether the 
changeover will actually occur is an issue of great speculation and skepticism.  According 
to at least one report, the United States, eager to find a success story in the Balkans and to 
bring missions there to a close, may push for the mandate not to be extended.106  Whether 
that would imply turning the mission over to the EU or ending it completely is unknown. 
Alarmingly, the support that has made ESDP different from previous initiatives in 
post-World War II multinational European military security cooperation may be in 
danger of crumbling away in the UK.  The British government has been supportive of the 
ESDP, and has increased the UK contribution to the force catalogue with four C-17 
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heavy-lift aircraft and 100 armored vehicles.107  However, Conservative Party opposition 
to the ESDP led by Iain Duncan Smith has emerged in the last few months, owing to 
fears that ESDP could jeopardize the trans-Atlantic relationship.  Shadow Defence 
Secretary and Member of Parliament Bernard Jenkin, taking the same viewpoint as 
Smith, is worried about “what it [ESDP] will take away” from European defense.  Jenkin 
notes that the structures of the ESDP “deliberately exclude the US.”108   
That such views exist is not surprising.  What is surprising is the growing 
resistance to the ESDP in the UK, especially when the current EU drive to take over 
NATO’s operation Amber Fox in Macedonia is mentioned.  Two documents recently 
leaked from the British Ministry of Defence (MoD) cast doubt on the EU’s ability to 
conduct even a small operation like Amber Fox and raise questions about British support 
for the ESDP.  “There would be a real risk that the EU’s first mission would end in 
failure or rescue by a re-engaged NATO, which would be disastrous in presentational 
terms,” the documents say.109  The documents continue, “An EU-led operation in 
Macedonia would not be ‘premature’ but simply wrong…we should not risk stability in 
the Balkans by opting for an EU-led operation.”110  These documents cast doubt on the 
British commitment to the ESDP (although the opposition to an EU takeover of Amber 
Fox could also be interpreted as a fear that any early failure of the ESDP could jeopardize 
its long-term prospects) and give more ammunition to the Tories who claim that the 
Headline Goal force is “a paper army desperately trying to find a mission to prove 
itself.”111   
Additionally, in what might be a noteworthy blow to any autonomous EU military 
capability, the MoD documents continue, “We [in the British MoD] would reject any 
attempt to go for an EU-led operation in circumstances where the US did want to take 
part.”112  In effect, this would mean that NATO would take priority over working via the 
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EU.113  If the United States wanted to get involved, according to these MoD documents, 
NATO would have precedence.  How France and the rest of the EU members 
participating in the ESDP will respond to this development is yet to be seen, but this 
wavering support in the UK could prove to be a blow to the ESDP. 
In spite of the aspirations for ESDP operations in the near future, the EU needs to 
approach proposed missions with a sense of caution.  Those who fear the early 
deployment of Headline Goal forces are concerned not only about the immediate effects 
of a mission gone awry, but also about the long-lasting negative impact such a failed 
mission could have on any future development of the ESDP and the armed forces of the 
contributing nations.  According to Eckhard Lübkemeier of the German Foreign 
Ministry, 
Following the adoption of the Declaration on the Operational Capability 
[at Laeken in December 2001], the existence of such a [political] will may 
now be put to the test.  The Union needs to tread a careful path: on the one 
hand, providing conditions are right, it should make use of its existing yet 
still incomplete capabilities, while on the other, particularly when 
assuming such tasks for the first time, it should avoid overestimating its 
ability, for that might lead to operational failures that could set back the 
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IV. AN UNCERTAIN FUTURE: RECOMMENDATIONS 
FOR THE HEADLINE GOAL 
 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The 14 EU members participating in the ESDP agree that they need to improve 
their military capabilities and make them more effective.  The recent setbacks in meeting 
the Headline Goal have only served to increase the skepticism in some quarters about the 
EU’s military efforts.  Charles Heyman, editor of Jane’s World Armies, said that he was 
“astounded” at the EU’s December 2001 claim of some “operational” capability.  “No 
matter what the EU claims,” said Heyman, “it is quite obvious that a proper EU 
capability to mount a serious operation does not exist.”115   
Given, however, that the Headline Goal deadline of December 2003 is drawing 
ever closer, what are the prospects for improving capabilities?  What can the EU 
members do to remedy the shortcomings they have identified in their armed forces?  This 
chapter examines three problem areas and offers suggestions on how to address them.  
How the EU members deal with shortfalls in defense spending, opportunities to 
consolidate assets, and measures to narrow the widening trans-Atlantic capabilities gap, 
will determine the extent to which the EU will be a significant military player on the 
world stage.  It is difficult to reach precise judgments, given the vagueness with which 
the Petersberg tasks have been articulated; but it is possible that the EU will not be able 
to conduct more than “lower end” Petersberg Task operations by December 2003.  
Moreover, if current tendencies are not reversed, it is unclear whether the EU’s military 
options will be enlarged in the foreseeable future.    
B. FIND THE WILL TO SPEND, OR SPEND MORE WISELY? 
As has been previously mentioned, virtually all European defense budgets have 
shrunk since the mid-1980’s.  In the period from 1985 to 2000, European defense budgets 
have fallen, as a percentage of GDP, to the following levels: Germany, 3.2% to 1.6%; 
France, 4.0% to 2.6%; Italy, 2.3% to 1.9%; Belgium, 3.0% to 1.4%; Spain, 2.4% to 1.3%; 
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UK, 5.2% to 2.4%.116  During the same period, US defense spending declined from 6.5% 
of GDP to 3.0%.117  In this post-September 11th era, the United States has demonstrated a 
willingness to drastically increase defense spending in support of the war against 
terrorism.  On 1 August 2002, the US Senate passed a $355.4 billion defense 
appropriations bill for 2003, adding $34.4 billion to the Pentagon’s budget, which is the 
largest increase in two decades.118  In the Senate version, funding for procurement, 
research, personnel and operations, and maintenance programs all grow by at least 9%.119  
Funds are being appropriated for critical assets needed for the war on terror such as 15 
new C-17 airlifters, 4 KC-130J aerial refueling aircraft, and new Navy ships.120   
The same cannot be said of Europe.  With personnel costs rising at approximately 
5% per year, and with equipment costs rising at more than 5% above inflation, current 
defense budgets will only be able to sustain “substantially smaller forces” in Europe.121  
Additionally, given the environmental disaster caused by the flooding in Europe during 
August 2002, some European governments may not even be able to maintain defense 
budgets at present levels.  While Germany intends to deal with the damage caused by the 
floods by postponing a promised tax cut, Austria and the Czech Republic have chosen to 
cancel or reduce prior orders for jet fighter aircraft.122  With some estimates of European-
wide damage of 15 to 20 billion euros, these current reductions in defense spending will 
most certainly be followed by others of a potentially far greater nature as the cost of the 
damage rises.123 
Europe also faces a potential reduction in defense spending because of its 
demographics.  The Economist reports that by 2040 America will likely surpass Europe in 
terms of population, and by 2050 America will have a population of 550 million people 
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and rising, while Europe will have a population of 360 million and falling.124  The 
American populace is projected to be twice as big as it is now (thus constituting twice as 
large an economic market, dwarfing the EU), and significantly younger than that of 
Europe.  In Europe, the number of people over 65 will be equivalent to 60% of the 
working-age population, compared with only 40% in America.125  Consequently, as the 
demographics gradually shift over the coming years, Europe will be faced with ever-
increasing pension and health-care costs for the elderly.  The Economist concludes: 
If Europeans are unwilling to spend what is needed to be full military 
partners of America now, when 65-year-olds amount to 30% of the 
working-age population, they will be even less likely to do more in 2050, 
when the proportion of old people will have doubled. In short, the long-
term logic of demography seems likely to entrench America's power and 
to widen existing transatlantic rifts.126   
Given these trends, it becomes less and less likely that European governments 
will choose to spend more on military forces.  The few EU governments that have 
expressed an intention to spend more may have difficulty in sustaining such decisions.  
The political and demographic realities of Europe (which call for an emphasis on greater 
social programs at the expense of defense spending) make the drive for an ever-
increasing “peace dividend” an almost unstoppable trend, even in post-September 11th 
conditions.   
If the EU could create a mechanism for EU oversight and review of the defense 
portion of national budgets, maybe the current trend of shrinking defense budgets could 
be halted.  Even before the Helsinki meeting in December 1999, suggestions were made 
at the Cologne Summit of June 1999 that EU members use the UK’s then-current defense 
spending as a percentage of GDP (2.5%) or simply a level of spending 2% of GDP on 
defense as a benchmark.127  However, such suggestions were not well received.  The idea 
that the EU could have quasi-control over the size of defense budgets was repugnant, and 
therefore an opportunity to directly address the problem of falling defense spending was 
dismissed by the EU members.  In spite of such resistance, some experts continue to 
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argue that EU members should spend a larger percentage of GDP on defense.  However, 
it would be imprudent to expect Europeans to spend significantly more than they do at 
present.  In these circumstances, the focus should be on encouraging the Europeans to 
spend their resources in a more sensible manner. 
 For all the criticism that the US military receives for investing in force structures 
and weapon systems that are supposedly based upon a “Cold War mentality,” most of the 
European armed forces have persisted with “Cold War” thinking and force structures to 
an even greater degree.  As a result, for the most part, Europe’s current force structures 
appear ill-suited to carrying out Petersberg crisis management tasks.  First, out of 1.7 
million Europeans in the military, almost 1.15 million serve in army units.128  This figure 
is twice as large as the number that serve in European Union navies and air forces 
combined (260,000 and 360,000 respectively).129  This focus on land forces is not 
reflected in the makeup of the US armed forces.  The US military (including the reserves) 
is not only smaller, but far better balanced, with 470,700 people in the Army, 576,730 in 
the Navy and Marines, and 494,460 in the Air Force.130  Not surprisingly, most European 
governments spend around 50% of their defense budgets on personnel costs, and some 
even approach 70 to 80% of the defense budget.131  Many EU members also have large 
numbers of conscripts to train and equip (these are not included in the 1.7 million total, 
however).  See Appendix 2 for a military profile of EU members, to include conscripts.   
Even more puzzling is why the Europeans have retained over 50 army divisions 
which have no capability to be projected abroad.132  These divisions were organized to 
resist a Warsaw Pact invasion, but that risk disappeared forever in 1989-1991.  Although 
armor might be a significant factor in dealing with some of the most demanding 
Petersberg Tasks, there is no geostrategic reason why the Europeans should be supporting 
a force of over 18,000 medium and heavy tanks, which is three times as many as are 
owned by the US Army.133   
                                                 







With such a focus on land forces, it is no wonder that certain capabilities, 
especially airborne capabilities, have been neglected in favor of large national armies and 
their corresponding personnel costs.  This focus is even reflected in the Headline Goal, in 
which air and naval assets, proven to be vital in recent military contingencies, are 
addressed almost as an afterthought.134  The EU members lack sealift even more than 
airlift.  During the 1990-1991 Gulf War, almost 95% of the equipment deployed by the 
US-led coalition reached the region by sea.  In comparison, the United States has fifty 
large ships dedicated to sealift, while the EU members own a total of two smaller ships 
designed for the same mission.135  Though such armor-heavy force structures would have 
been vitally important for defending against a Soviet attack on Europe, they are far less 
relevant now, and probably of little value in helping the European Union to develop cost-
efficient forces capable of conducting EU-led crisis management operations.  The 
military options of the EU members clearly would be enhanced if they chose to strike a 
better balance between land, naval, and air assets.  Moving away from force structures 
that reflect the requirements of an earlier era would be a massive yet vital change. 
C. WORKING TOGETHER   
Another vital change that is necessary to make an operational ESDP a reality is to 
re-examine the process of working together on common defense initiatives.  Some 
weapons systems and other major pieces of equipment are simply becoming too costly 
for every country to own, let alone develop.  Instead of individual countries working on 
their own to develop their national capabilities, more attention should be given to the 
sharing of assets and/or national specialization in the particular capabilities that are the 
most demanding to develop and operate.   
One example of such an initiative is the Memorandum of Understanding between 
the Netherlands and Germany on the use of German Luftwaffe transport aircraft.  Rather 
than spend a great deal of money on new transport aircraft, the armed forces of the 
Netherlands now rely upon the Luftwaffe for airlift capability.  In return for 45.378 
million euros, the German government has promised that it “will provide strategic and 
tactical air transport services and medical air evacuation services to the Netherlands 
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Armed Forces” in that amount.136  However, this agreement is not merely designed to 
pay for services rendered.  The framers of this initiative realized that this represented a 
chance for Germany to improve its airlift capabilities as well.  The Memorandum also 
states that the Dutch payment of 45.378 million euros will allow Germany to “reallocate 
the respective part of the foreseen budget in order to reinforce European capabilities in 
other areas in which shortfalls have been identified in the framework of the [NATO] 
Defence Capabilities Initiative and the European [Union] Headline Goal.”137   
If similar arrangements could be worked out for other capabilities that are sorely 
lacking, yet very expensive to improve or acquire, the EU members could make great 
strides toward at least beginning the process of improving their armed forces.  Similar 
agreements on unmanned aerial vehicles, satellite access, combat search and rescue, and 
several other capabilities could in principle be developed, although the continuing lack of 
interoperability between national forces would have to be overcome.  Interoperability 
shortcomings may constitute another major obstacle to working together effectively in 
permissive non-combat environments, to say nothing of actual war zones.   
Joint development projects, despite their somewhat checkered and complex 
history in European defense establishments (e.g., the Panavia Tornado fighter-bomber), 
also make the process of developing a new weapon system more accessible to smaller 
nations with less money to devote to research and development.  Some European nations 
propose to solve the problem of long-range air transport by pledging together to buy the 
Airbus A400M military transport, which still has not left the drawing board.  Eight 
European countries have pledged to buy 196 Airbus A400M four-engine transports in an 
effort to diminish their long-standing reliance on the US Air Force to do the heavy lifting.   
The fragility of such multi-national endeavors was demonstrated, however, when 
Germany declared in late January 2002 that it could not devote enough money from its 
national budget to pay for its share of the project.138  The entire project, already burdened 
by delays and setbacks, nearly collapsed.   In March 2002 Germany was able to commit 
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to a portion of its original order (40 instead of 73 aircraft), but the entire project is 
continuing under the assumption that Germany will find the funds promised to buy its 
remaining share (33) of the aircraft.  Should the economic situation in Germany take a 
drastic turn for the worse, as it potentially could after the devastating August 2002 
flooding, the project could again be in jeopardy.  With a delivery date estimated to be 
2010 or beyond, such setbacks make the strategic airlift gap even more worrisome.  In 
spite of the difficulties being experienced with projects like the A400M, Javier Solana, 
High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), has declared 
that integration is more important than ever.   
Increased solidarity and a stronger sense of common interests among 
member states reduce the scope for purely national military intervention 
and push towards more integration between their armed forces.  Therefore 
it should not be hard to move more decisively towards greater task sharing 
among our military [forces], development of multinational capabilities, 
pooling of resources or assets, joint operation and maintenance.  Areas 
such as strategic mobility or communication and information systems 
(CIS) are prime candidates for progress in that approach.139 
D. NARROWING THE EU-US R&D INVESTMENT GAP  
The efforts of EU members in pursuit of an autonomous military capability have been 
commendable, but to achieve their goals they will need to do more to narrow the trans-Atlantic 
R&D investment gap.  Spending more on R&D would not necessarily require an overall increase 
in European defense spending, although that would be desirable.  Streamlining their armed forces 
and concentrating on the operational requirements at hand (instead of those of the Cold War) 
could free up money to be re-allocated to R&D.  A common European complaint about R&D is 
that the United States is not willing to share its technology with its partners across the Atlantic, 
but at the same time Europeans have called attention to their own civilian technological advances.  
As Professor Keith O’Nions, chief scientific advisor to the British Ministry of Defence, has said, 
“gaps in basic science and technology are small: often non-existent through globalization.”140  
His point is that emerging civil technologies, including Information Technology, biochemistry, 
and nanotechnology, developed with no military applications in mind, are readily available in the 
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civilian market.141  The United States does not have a monopoly on these markets or 
technologies.  Additionally, many of the improvements necessary to fight alongside the US 
armed forces in major operations, or apart from the US armed forces in EU-led crisis 
management operations, are not hindered by cost, but rather by political will.  General Joseph 
Ralston, SACEUR, has stated that, “If you can afford a $25-million aircraft, don’t you think you 
could put a $5,000 radio in it?”142  If the Europeans do not have the political will to make 
inexpensive investments to improve their ability to contribute interoperable military capabilities 
to NATO operations, what evidence is there that they will enhance their capabilities for EU 
operations?   
An analysis of ECAP (see Appendix I) shows that several EU countries have not 
demonstrated the political will even to participate in capability improvement projects, let alone 
lead them.  France, Spain, and the UK have each volunteered to lead four projects, while Italy and 
the Netherlands have each volunteered to lead three projects.  Germany, Greece, Portugal, and 
Sweden have each signed up to lead one or two of the forty capability improvement efforts in 
ECAP.  In terms of leaders, only seven of the fourteen EU participants in ESDP have 
volunteered, and over a dozen projects lack any leader.  As Frans Osinga states, ECAP “may 
easily be another chapter in Europe’s checkerboard of defence cooperation methods, which thus 
far has still not resulted in substantially altering the way Europe procures defence equipment, nor 
the territorial defence posture.   On the other hand, this plan could, in bringing defence planners in 
frequent contact, create enough groundswell and act as a catalyst towards more ambitious 
plans.”143  If NATO’s Defense Capabilities Initiative is any indicator, however, the latter 
development is doubtful.  Javier Solana stated that 
We must also make sure that the ECAP ultimately delivers real 
capabilities.  Regular reporting and review have to be put in place, in order 
to measure progress made and give added impetus in the areas where it is 
insufficient or absent.  Ministers of Defence have a central role to play in 
that respect, in framing common goals and ensuring their implementation 
by their respective national governments.144 
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Whether ECAP can live up to Javier Solana’s expectations is yet to be seen, but little comfort can 
be drawn from the fact that twenty of the forty projects remain leaderless, and six of those have 
no participants at all. 
While some Europeans have complained about US unilateralism or “hyperpower,” the 
fundamental obstacles to greater EU influence in international security affairs reside in the EU’s 
military shortcomings and political divisions.145  European interoperability shortcomings are 
representative of both problems.  As Lisa Bronson, the US Department of Defense’s Director of 
Technology Security and Counter-Proliferation, recently said, “None of us gets out of bed saying 
‘what can we do alone?’  But if you can’t talk together you can’t fight together…A lot of good 
friends wanted to participate [in operations in Afghanistan].  We had to tell them that you don’t 
have the interoperability—and we weren’t talking state of the art.”146  Additional factors may 
have been involved, however. 
Some European observers have identified yet another factor [for the lack 
of larger European contributions to Operation Enduring Freedom].  In 
their view, even when European allies offered militarily relevant 
capabilities in support of the campaign against the Taliban government 
and the Al Qa’ida terrorists in Afghanistan, the United States was cautious 
and selective in accepting their assistance because of political and strategic 
incentives to achieve positive results promptly, without the complications 
of coordinating unneeded contributions from allies and other countries.  In 
other words, it seems to some European experts that, if the United States 
could effectively conduct combat operations without allied assistance, the 
Americans responsible for these operations preferred this course of action, 
despite its implications for transatlantic relations.147 
This American approach to operations in Afghanistan was likely influenced by the US 
experience during Operation Allied Force in 1999.  A common American complaint concerned 
the problem of coordinating actions with many allies that often had different views on how to use 
the Alliance’s airpower.  However, the American experience in the Kosovo conflict supports 
Bronson’s observation.  During Allied Force, every European offensive mission required three 
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US supporting aircraft.148  If European allies acquire greater capabilities, they are likely to have 
more political influence and more significant operational roles. 
E. FINAL THOUGHTS 
The ESDP and the Headline Goal have not yet been as successful as the 
participating EU governments intended them to be.  EU leaders declared ESDP 
capabilities “operational” to take part in “some” crisis management missions in 
December 2001, but there is little chance that the full complement of combat forces and 
associated capabilities envisaged in the Headline Goal will be ready for deployment by 
the scheduled deadline of December 2003, although accepting responsibility for the 
Amber Fox operation in Macedonia is a possibility.  Moreover, search and rescue and 
humanitarian missions in permissive environments are feasible with the forces currently 
pledged to the EU.149   
An EU force incapable of performing all the Petersberg Tasks would be regarded 
as a failure for the EU.  If this result is to be avoided, France, Germany, and the UK will 
need to set an example for the rest of the EU to follow.  These three countries could 
change the dangerous trend of declining European military capability, narrow the 
widening gap between NATO European and US military capabilities, and convince their 
fellow EU members that capable militaries are a vital necessity to lessen dependence 
upon the United States for military support.   
There is evidence that France, Germany, and the UK are taking (or may soon 
take) some preliminary steps to reverse current trends.  In the British Ministry of 
Defence’s “New Chapter” for its Strategic Defence Review released in July 2002, 
Defence Secretary Geoffrey Hoon outlined plans to increase defense spending by £3.5 
billion over the next three years.150  Discussing the need for “network-centric capability” 
bringing together sensors and strike assets, the document states that, “The outcome of 
Spending Review 2002, with the biggest sustained real increase in Defence spending 
plans for 20 years, will enable us to make the investment necessary to acquire these sorts 
of capabilities.”151   
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France has also made preliminary plans to increase defense spending.  Sensing a 
widening gap between British and French defense spending and military capabilities, and 
perhaps concerned by an apparent American focus on British contributions to the war in 
Afghanistan, French President Jacques Chirac announced in July 2002 that he intends to 
increase funding for the French armed forces.  The budget increase will be submitted for 
a parliamentary vote “before the end of the year” and could possibly infuse 1.1 billion 
additional euros a year into the French defense budget.152   
German Chancellor Gerhard Schröder has made statements indicating that, should 
he and his coalition win the election on 22 September 2002, defense spending increases 
will be possible.  The Social Democrats proposed in their budget for 2003, released in 
June 2002, that defense spending would be increased by 767 million euros (for a 24.4 
billion euro defense budget).  Though a modest increase such as this could be helpful, 
certain areas are actually losing money, such as R&D and aeronautical equipment 
procurement.153  This budget’s adoption depends on whether Schröder can retain his 
coalition’s place in power.  The CDU/CSU parties are also vying for control of the 
Bundestag.  Headed by Bavarian Minister-President Edmund Stoiber, the opposition 
parties pledge to raise funding for the German armed forces, but do not give an exact 
amount.  Wolfgang Schauble, advisor to Mr. Stoiber, declined to disclose firm spending 
targets, but said, “We won’t solve the problems of underfinancing of the armed forces in 
2003, but we’ll make a start…It will be a step-by-step process.”154  Provided such 
statements are more than campaign rhetoric, the German armed forces could see larger 
budgets regardless of who wins the election.  It seems that the three leading members of 
the EU in defense spending are taking the right course by increasing their efforts, thereby 
leading the EU in the right direction. 
An emerging EU military capability could be significant for the United States and 
the world.  As the US armed forces increasingly engage in operations further afield, the 
United States will need capable European allies, and will continue to encourage them to 
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take the necessary steps to develop their capabilities.  As US Defense Secretary Donald 
Rumsfeld told troops at the NATO airbase in Geilenkirchen, Germany : 
The risks that face the world because of weapons of mass destruction and 
their availability to terrorists and terrorist networks through terrorist states 
is a significant risk. It is a risk of a different order than we have 
experienced previously with conventional weapons, and it seems to me 
that that reality is something that will suggest to the populations of our 
respective countries that spending 2 ½ or 3 percent of our Gross National 
Product before the fact – to be able to deter and defend and prevent those 
kinds of attacks – is not much when one thinks about it. And allowing 
those kinds of attacks to take place – where, rather than 3,000 people 
being killed as was the case in New York and Washington, you’re talking 
with a weapon of mass destruction of tens of thousands or potentially 
hundreds of thousands of people, 2 ½ or 3 percent of a Gross National 
Product doesn’t sound like very much.155 
The benefits of more capable EU forces currently exceed the risks involved with their 
development.  In fact, the ESDP has the potential to improve what have recently been 
characterized as strained trans-Atlantic relations.  As Eckhard Lübkemeier of the German 
Foreign Ministry has written, 
Without the ESDP, however, the potential for friction [between the 
European Union and the United States] would presumably be greater still, 
since now [that] the Cold War is over the United States expects the 
Europeans to shoulder a greater share of our common responsibility for 
security.  Moreover, North America and Europe continue to be each 
other’s principal partners on the international political scene, and a 
stronger Europe is thus just as much in the Americans’ interest as a strong 
America.156 
 Even though the EU may prefer to emphasize its achievements, an operational 
Headline Goal force capable of conducting the full range of Petersberg Tasks will not be 
ready by 2003.  A more realistic goal would be 2010-2012.  Approaching full operational 
capability in an incremental fashion could prove to be a more reasonable course of action.  
Instead of using December 2003 as a firm deadline, the EU might find advantages in 
setting less ambitious goals.  For example, by December 2003 the EU could feasibly 
declare an ability to deploy two to three brigade-level formations in support of 
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humanitarian and rescue tasks, and limited peacekeeping operations.157  This move, 
while not meeting the goals set forth in Helsinki, would make it clear to other nations and 
to other security institutions such as NATO what missions the EU contributors to the 
force catalogue would be willing and able to undertake.  Although it would only be a 
partially complete Headline Goal force, such a success story could promote a reduction in 
the rate of decline of post-Cold War European defense spending, and possibly even 
encourage EU members to spend more and to improve their military capabilities.158  That 
would change perceptions of the Headline Goal.  It would then be seen not as a military 
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APPENDIX I—European Capabilities Action Plan (20 June 2002)* 
SER SHORTFALL LEADS PARTICIPANTS OBSERVERS 
1 & 17 Attack Helicopter & 
Support Helicopters 
SP BE FI FR GR NL 
UK 
 
2 Civil Military Co-operation   AU 
3 General Maintenance 
Engineering 
   
4 General Support 
Engineering 
  UK 
5 General Support Logistics  UK  
6 Light Infantry Brigade HQ 
& Augmentees 
   
7 Light/Medium Armoured 
Companies 
  UK 
8 Medical Collective 
Protection Role 3 
  BE UK 
9 Medical Role 3 SP NL UK AU BE 
10 Military Intelligence Units    
11 Military Police  NL AU 
12 NBC UK AU BE FI FR GE 
IT NL PO SP SW 
 
13 Press Info Group    
14 PSYOPS    
15 Recovery/Maintenance    
16 Special Operations Forces PO BE FI IR UK  
18 UAV / STA Units GE NL 
SW 
AU FI FR PO SP 
UK 
BE GR IR IT 
19 Transport Units  UK  
20 Carrier Based Airpower SP FR IT UK  
21 Maritime Medical 
Evacuation Units 
 UK  




23 Combat Search and Rescue GE IT FR IT NL UK BE GR SP 
24 Cruise Missiles & Precision 
Guided Munitions 
FR FI GE IT NL SP UK 
25 Suppression of Enemy Air 
Defense 
FR GE GR NL SP BE FI UK 
26 Theatre Ballistic Missile 
Defense 
NL FR GE GR IT SP UK 
27 Deployable 
Communications Modules 
IT  FR GE AU SW 
28 Headquarters (OHQ, FHQ, 
CCHQ) & Augmentees 
UK FI FR GE IT NL 
SP SW 
GR IR 
29 Multinational Joint Logistic 
Centre & Augmentees 
 UK AU 
30 BDA (Operational Level)  GE SP SW  
31 Early Warning and Distant 
Detection Strategic Level 
 FR UK 
32 Strategic ISR IMNT 
Collection 
FR BE GE SP UK  
33 Strategic ISR SIGINT 
Collection 
  UK 
34 Theatre Surveillance and 
Reconnaissance Air Ground 
Picture 
 GE IT SP SW UK IR 
35 Theatre Surveillance and 
Reconnaissance Air Picture 
SW UK   
36 UAV (HALE-MALE) FR NL GE IT PO SP SW 
UK 
AU BE 
37 Out Sized Transport 
Aircraft 
UK BE GE IT FR SP 
38 General Cargo Aircraft  BE FR GE IT NL  
39 & 
40 
RO-RO & General Cargo 
Shipping 
GR BE GE IT NL UK FR SP 
*Shaded rows indicate ACTIVE programs 






APPENDIX II—A Military Profile of EU Member States 
EU Member Defense 
Expenditure 














Austria 0.8 35,500 1,161 17,500 Volunteers 
only 
2,000 
Belgium 1.4 39,250 3,450 None N/A 3,000 
Denmark 1.5 21,810 1,325 5,025 No None 
Finland 1.3 31,700 938 23,100 No 2,000 
France 2.6 294,430 35,391 58,710 
(ends 2001)
N/A 12,000 
Germany 1.6 321,000 7,693 128,400 Volunteers 
only 
13,000 
Greece 4.9 159,170 1,930 98,321 Volunteers 
only 
3,500 
Ireland 0.7 11,460 885 None N/A 850 
Italy 1.9 250,600 8,344 111,800 Volunteers 
only 
12,000 
Luxembourg 0.8 899 23 None N/A 100 
Netherlands 1.9 51,940 5,999 None N/A 5,000 





Spain 1.3 166,050 2,500 51,700 N/A 6,000 
Sweden 2.2 52,700 1,353 32,800 Volunteers 
only 
1,500 
UK 2.4 212,450 36,459 None N/A 12,500 
Total  1,693,609 109,898   74,950 
 
 
Source: Patrick Keatinge and Ben Tonra, The European Rapid Reaction Force (Dublin: 
Institute of European Affairs, 2002), 27.  Note: Due to the lack of a published force 
catalogue, the figures in the “Initial Troop Contribution to Force Catalogue” column vary 




























































APPENDIX III: Detailed Estimations of Contributions to the Force Catalogue 
 
Austria: one mechanized infantry battalion, one light infantry battalion, 1 Nuclear, 
Biological, Chemical Defense unit, one “humanitarian civilian assistance package,” one 
Civil-Military Cooperation (CIMIC) element, one helicopter transport squadron, one 
transport company, 100 observers/experts.  
 
Belgium: Land: one mechanized brigade, plus smaller units as part of humanitarian 
operation for up to six months.  Air: 24 F-16 fighters, eight C-130 and two Airbus 
transports.  Navy: two frigates, mine countermeasures (MCM) vessels.  
 
Denmark: No contribution; opted out of ESDP at Maastricht in 1992.  
 
Finland: Land: one mechanized infantry battalion, one engineer battalion, one transport 
company, one CIMIC company.  Navy: one MCM command and support ship.  Joint: 
15-30 experts/observers.  
 
France: Land: 12,000 troops from a 20,000 pool; Mechanised, light, airborne (for a 
year), and amphibious brigades headquarters.  Air: Combined Air Operations Center, 75 
combat aircraft, eight air-refueling aircraft, three long-range and 24 medium-range 
transports, two Airborne Warning & Control System aircraft, combat search & rescue 
(CSAR) helicopters.  Navy: Two battle groups, each with one nuclear attack submarine 
(SSN), four frigates, three support ships, and maritime patrol aircraft.  One would include 
the nuclear powered aircraft carrier Charles de Gaulle with 22 aircraft aboard.  Mine 
countermeasures vessels. Joint: Permanent military operations headquarters at Creil if 
required, others at operational and tactical levels, satellite communications, 
reconnaissance satellites and aircraft.  
 
The Eurocorps headquarters has also been offered for the force.  
 
Germany: Land: Nucleus land component headquarters, up to 18,000 troops from a pool 
of 32,000 at division and brigade level, including armored, air assault, and light infantry 
brigade headquarters and seven combat battalions.  Air: Nucleus air component 
headquarters, six combat squadrons with 93 aircraft, eight surface-to-air missile (SAM) 
squadrons, air transport, other support elements.  Navy: Maritime headquarters, 13 
combat ships, support.  Joint: Permanent military operations headquarters at Potsdam if 
required, nucleus operational headquarters.  
 
Greece: Land: one operational headquarters, one mechanized or other brigade, one light 
infantry battalion, one attack and one transport helicopter company.  Air: 42 fighter 
aircraft, four transport aircraft, one Patriot SAM battalion, one short-range air defense 
(SHORAD) squadron.  Navy: Escorts, one submarine.  
 
Ireland: one light infantry battalion, 40-strong Army Ranger Wing Special Forces unit, 
headquarters, observer, and support elements.  850 total.  
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Italy: Land: one corps-level headquarters for six months, one division headquarters for a 
year, 12,500 troops from a 20,000 pool (including an airmobile brigade for up to six 
months and three other brigades), one railway-engineering battalion, special forces, one 
CIMIC group, one Nuclear, Biological, Chemical Defense company.  Air: a Combined 
Air Operations Center (air component headquarters), 26 Tornado and AMX combat 
aircraft, six CSAR helicopters, four C-130J transport aircraft (from 2003), nine tactical 
transport aircraft, two air refueling aircraft, three maritime patrol aircraft, two SHORAD 
units.  Navy: A sea or shore-based maritime component headquarters; one task group 
with one aircraft carrier (Giuseppe Garibaldi), one destroyer, three frigates, four patrol 
ships, one submarine, four MCM ships, two amphibious ships, one oceanographic vessel, 
eight helicopters.  
 
Luxembourg: one reconnaissance company, one A400M transport aircraft.  100 total.  
 
Netherlands: Land: with Germany, Headquarters I German-Netherlands Corps, one 
mechanized Brigade, 11th Airmobile Brigade, one amphibious battalion.  Air: one to two 
F-16 fighter squadrons; transport aircraft, SAM squadrons.  Navy: Air defense and 
command frigates, multipurpose frigates, landing platform dock Rotterdam.  
 
Portugal: Land: one infantry brigade, including reconnaissance, armored, artillery, 
engineer, signals, logistics, military police, and CIMIC elements; two teams of military 
observers.  Total 4000.  Air: squadron with 12 F-16, four C-130 transports, 12 C212 
tactical transports, three maritime patrol aircraft, four tactical air control parties, four 
medium transport helicopters.  Navy: one frigate, one submarine, one survey ship, one 
support ship.  
 
Spain: Land: division headquarters to coordinate humanitarian operations and a brigade 
HQ for other operations, one brigade, mountain unit, one light infantry battalion at high 
readiness available as an immediate reaction force.  Air: one Mirage F-1 squadron, one 
F/A-18 squadron each of 12 aircraft, six transport aircraft, two each surveillance, 
electronic warfare, and strategic transport aircraft (A400M).  Navy: one carrier group 
including carrier Principe de Asturias, two frigates and support ships, one submarine, one 
MCM ship,  Spanish-Italian Amphibious Force (SIAF).  
 
Sweden: One mechanized infantry battalion including intelligence, electronic 
warfare/signals, reconnaissance, engineer, and explosive ordinance disposal units.  
Air: tactical reconnaissance element of four AJS 37 Viggen to be replaced in 2004 by 
four JAS 39 Gripen multirole fighters, one airbase unit (225 personnel), four C-130 
transport aircraft.  Navy: two corvettes, one support ship.  
 
United Kingdom: Joint: Permanent Joint HQ (Northwood) if required, at least one 
mobile joint headquarters, including a Combined Air Operations Center (CAOC).  Land: 
either an armored or a mechanized brigade, each of which could be sustained for at least 
a year, or 16th Air Assault Brigade, which could be deployed for up to six months.  
Combat support forces such as artillery, air defense, and attack helicopters could also be 
deployed, supported by logistics forces.  Total 12,500.  Navy: one aircraft carrier, two 
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SSNs, up to four destroyers or frigates, and support vessels.  An amphibious task group 
including one helicopter carrier and 3rd Commando Brigade could also be made 
available.  The aircraft carrier, helicopter carrier, and submarines could not necessarily be 
sustained continuously for a whole year.  Air: up to 72 combat aircraft, including naval 
fighters, with 58 associated support aircraft including 15 tankers, strategic transport 
aircraft, and Chinook and Merlin transport helicopters.  This total would be available for 
an initial six months to cover initial theatre entry; for a longer term commitment the 
number would reduce. 
 
 
Source: “The European Union’s ‘Headline Goal’—Current Status,” Center for Defense 
Information, Washington D.C., available online at http://www.cdi.org/mrp/eu.cfm, 
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